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Summary 
 
This work is aimed to demonstrate that in poor countries with bad institutions, foreign aid 
may lead to a resource curse. Foreign aid which is aimed to bring growth and prosperity to the 
receipient countries in the majority of cases fails to fulfill its main tasks. Many empirical, 
croth-countires and theoretical models shows that the quality of institutions plays an 
important role in the economic growth of the country. Good, sound institutions leads to a 
sustainable economic grouth with or without a ”BIG Push”, while bad, ”grabber-friendly” as 
defined by Halvor Mehlum, institutions are biggest barriers for aid receipent countires to 
achieve sustainable development and prosperity for thier people. Moldova – as an aid 
receipent country, is a good example of a country with ”grabber –friendly” institutions which 
alowed rent-seekers to steel almost1 billion USD, which costitutes almost 12% of Moldova’s 
GDP and still be among Moldova’s political elite.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
Resource curse is the phenomenon that countries with abundant natural resources do not 
perform as well economically as those without. Many economists draw a parallel between the 
effect of finding natural resources and the effect of getting foreign aid on economic 
development. The reason why natural resource wealth may lead to to poor political and 
economic outcomes is that public institutions manage to fulfill their task of distributing the 
revenues in a fair and efficient way.   In this thesis, I discuss how foreign aid may lead to a 
resource curse in countries with bad or weak institutions 
Tim Hartford (2015) sums up the possible harms from resource abundance: “first, the revenue 
from resources creates volatility in government revenues that, if poorly managed, will lead to 
inflation and boom-and-bust cycles in government spending. Second, it produces foreign 
currency earnings that, if not neutralized by monetary policy, will raise the real exchange rate, 
undermining the competitiveness of other sectors. Third, they can damage institutions, 
including governance and the legal system indirectly, by removing incentives to reform, 
improve infrastructure, or even establish a well-functioning tax bureaucracy, provoking a 
fight to control resource rents” (Tim Harford, Aid and the Resource Curse, 2015).This work is 
aimed to demonstrate that in poor countries with bad institutions, aid may lead to a resource 
curse.  In the first section, I explain the resource curse and give a brief review on the 
literature.   
Next, I present a theoretical model of the resource curse, which will form the basis for the 
reasoning on aid and resource curse. A main result is that whether resources are a blessing or 
a curse depends on the political institutions of the country.  
In the third section, I discuss how aid may lead to similar resource curse problems as rents 
from natural resources. Present and discuss the literature on aid and the resource curse.  
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 In the fourth section, I briefly compare how differences the effect of exogenous resources 
depends on institutional quality in four countries: Norway and Botswana – with high 
institutional quality – are compared with Zimbabwe and Moldova – with low institutional 
quality.  
My main contribution is to investigate the potential resource curse from foreign aid in 
Moldova. In the last section I give evidence for bad institutional quality in Moldova. One 
crucial piece of evidence is the incredible disappearance of 1 billion dollar from the 3 largest 
banks in Moldova – amounting to 12 percent of Moldova’s GDP. 
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1. Resource curse 
 
 
 
1.1. What is a resource curse? 
 
 
One of the definitions of a resource curse is that it is “ the paradox that countries with 
abundance of natural resources, specifically point-source non-renewable like minerals and 
fuels, tend to have less economic growth and worth development outcomes that countries with 
fewer natural resources.” (Wikipedia) 
The paradox is that not only may resource-rich countries fail to benefit from precious 
resources, but they actually perform worse than countries which are not blessed with natural 
resources.  
The curse theory emerged in the 1990s with pioneering contrubutions by Sachs & Warner 
(1995). The term resource curse was first used by Richard Auty in 1993. He theorized that 
having certain natural resources including oil actually curses a country. Richard Auty studied 
and tried to explain negative relationship between natural resource wealth and economic 
growth. He showed that a resource boom affects the rest of the economy through two 
channels:  the resource movement effect and the spending effect. A discovery of natural 
resources raises the value of the marginal product of labour in the resource sector and pushes 
the equilibrium wage rate up, leading to a movement of labour from both the manufacturing 
and non-tradable sectors to the resources sector.  A boom in the natural resource sector leads 
to increased income for the country, and as a result increases domestic import of both tradable 
and non-tradable goods and services, while export in other branches of economy falls.  
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R. Auty explanations of resource curse fall into three main categories: Dutch Disease, trade 
openness and governance or the quality of institutions.                                          
                                                           
                                                           
 
 
 
                                        
 
 
Dutch disease models explain a negative impact of natural resources as follows.  Natural 
resource booms increases real wages and appreciates the real exchange rate, this lowers the 
competitiveness and production of the other sectors of the economy.  Larger export revenues 
from natural resources cause the real exchange rate to appreciate. 
 This is a consequence of either the local currency appreciation against other currencies, or the 
increase in the local price levels, or both.  This makes local manufactures or agriculture more 
expensive in foreign-currency terms, and so they lose competitiveness and lose its value for 
the economy. Much higher salaries in the resource dominant sector also attract the best skills 
and talent out of other sectors, out of government, and out of civil society. Overall, the 
booming natural resource sector ‘crowds out’ or wither these other sectors of the economy.  
A second standard explanation for the Resource Curse is revenue volatility. Booms and busts 
in world commodity prices and revenues can destabilize the economies of countries that 
depend on natural resources export.   
The third category for explaining the Resource Curse – the one I will focus on  – falls under 
the headline ‘governance ‘or the quality of institutions and rent-seeking. Rent-seeking can be 
one of the main causes of declining  economic growth and can also lead the country into 
Resource curse 
Governance or the 
quality of institutions 
 
Revenue volatility or 
trade openness 
 
Dutch 
Disease 
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poverty and class differences in the society.  It is not the resource by itself that  is the reason 
for  the curse,  but how the income from this resource is distributed and used.  If natural 
resources are used as a source for rent-seeking and self - enrichment then it is a curse, but if 
resources are used as tool to secure another economic branches, then the whole economy can 
gain by accumulating additional capital which can be use for further economic development. 
 
1.2.  Rent seeking. 
 
This work is aimed to investigate and demonstrate the resource curse from rent-seeking and 
this is what I will focus on. Rent-seeking is a concept used to describe the activities aimed to 
obtain or maintain wealth, primary with the help of state.  By other words, instead of making 
a productive contribution to an economy, a rent – seeker obtain benefits for themselves by 
manipulating the countries policies, rules, political and economical environment.  Easy, 
unearned money from resource fairy tale leads to conflict between people and government.  
Large amounts of resources and money are attractive for a country‘s government who use 
them for their own luxuries rather than for the people. Easy money leads to internal conflict 
which occurs within societies, as different groups and factions fight for their share of the 
cake. This leads to limited ability of government institutions to function effectively; to 
conflict between different government ministries and departments for access to resource 
money. “Easy money” from resource “fairy tale” may also lead to both internal and 
international war and conflict.  The term” petro-aggression” has been used to describe the 
tendency of oil –rich states to instigate international conflicts or to be the target of a conflict. 
When easy rents are available, rulers lose interest in the difficult challenges of state-building, 
or the need for a skilled, educated workforce, and instead spend their energies competing with 
each other for access to a slice of the natural resource ‘cake’. 
Weak state institutions, which are not able to distribute the income from natural resources 
correctly, can also lead to corruption. The corrupted government is less interested in building 
the institutional infrastructure to regulate and tax a productive economy, because a well-
functioning institutional infrastructure might not allow the corrupted government to misuse 
the profit from natural resources.   
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1.3.   Can foreign aid give a resource curse? 
 
Might aid also give a resource curse just like natural resources do? Foreign aid provides a 
windfall of resources to recipient country and may result in the same rent seeking behaviour 
as documented in the Resource Curse literature.  Many countries in the World are aid 
receivers without any significant improvement in their social and economical situation. For 
example, Burkina Faso, foreign aid accounts for two-thirds of the government budget and (% 
of GDP over the period 1985-89.  In Mauritania, it accounted for 60% and 22%, respectively, 
for the period 1980-84. In Rwanda, Vanuatu, Gambia, Niger, Tonga and Mali, foreign donors 
provided over a third of the government budget during some 5-year periods between 1960-
1999. Some countries are totally depended on foreign aid.  Aid accounted for 40% of the 
government budget and 6.2 of GDP in Burkina Faso during 1960-1999. In Mauritania, for 
37% and 12% respectively. 
Some analysts argue that aid can slow growth by increasing the value of the local currency, 
which makes the manufacturing sector less competitive. Other argues that aid may reduce tax 
revenue mobilization and that the conditions imposed by donors may lead to excessive 
concentration of talented and skilled working force in aid administration. 
Several investigations have show that some aid money goes missing before reaching the 
actual recipients, and this money may as well have the same characteristics as those of natural 
resource revenue. 
In his article “what can we learn about the “Resource Curse ” from Foreign Aid, 2010” Kevin 
M. Morrison draws a parallel between resource aid and foreign aid, arguing that the Curse is 
in the “ function of the institutional environment in which these resources are found and how 
the revenues are used.”  
A recent empirical literature has investigated the role of institutions on development. Mauro 
(1995, 1998), Knack and Keefer (1999), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001,2002), 
Easterly and Levine (2003), Dollar and Kraay (2003) and Rodrik(2004), Mehlum, Moene and 
Torvik  (2006) among others, show a positive relationship between good institutions and 
development.   
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In next section. I present the theoretical model of Mehlum, Moene and Torvik  (2006) in more 
details, to show what are the relationship between economic growth and the quality of state’s 
institutions.  
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2. A Theoretical Model of the resource curse 
 
In this section I present a theoretical model by Mehlum, Moene and Torvik  (2006), 
investigating the relation between institutions and the resource curse .  In this model, 
entrepreneurs can either be producers or rent seekers (grabbers).  The equilibrium allocation 
of entrepreneurs between production and grabbing is determined by revenue that they can 
earn from the two activities. Which activity is more profitable depends on the quality of 
institutions or the “rule of law”. This gives two types of equilibrium in the model.  When 
institutional quality is high we have a “producer’s equilibrium”. When the institutional quality 
is low, the equilibrium is a ‘grabber equilibrium’, where some entrepreneurs are producers 
and some are grabbers.  More natural resources are a “blessing in production equilibrium”, 
while more natural resources are a “ curse in a grabber equilibrium”.  
The total number of entrepreneurs is denoted by N = nP + nG, where nP are producers while nG 
are grabbers. Grabbers are interested in rents from natural resources R and use all their 
capacity to earn as much as possible of this rent. The quality of the institutions determines 
how much of the rent they can grab.  In the model the institutional quality is captured by the 
parameter λ, which goes from 0 (bad quality institutions) to 1(good quality institutions).  
When λ = 0, the system is completely grabber friendly such that grabbers extract the entire 
rent, each of them obtaining R/nG.  A higher λ implies a more producer friendly institutions. 
When λ = 1, there are no gains from specialisation in grabbing as both grabbers and producers 
each obtain the share R/N of resources.  Thus, 1/λ is a measure of the degree to which an 
entrepreneur gains if they decide to pursue grabbing activities.  In countries where λ is low, 
this relative gain from grabbing is large.  
In the model, grabbing and production are competing activities. In countries where λ is high, 
grabbing and production may become complementary. The higher is λ, the lower is the gain 
from grabbing and the less producers would like to switch from production to become 
grabbers. 
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The pay-off  πG to each grabber is a factor s times R/N 
                                                              ( 1 )                                                                                                             
while each producer's share of the resource rent is λsR/N. The factor s is decreasing in λ since 
each grabber gets less the more producer-friendly the institutions. As the value of λ goes up 
from zero to one, profits for grabbers goes down. Grabbers therefore prefer bad institutions.  
There is also a positive effect on s from less competition between grabbers. Hence, the value 
of s is an increasing function of the fraction of producers α = nP/N and a decreasing function 
of the institutional parameter λ.   
The payoff for grabbers is also increasing in the fraction of producers, α. The reason is that an 
increase in the number of producers reduces competition for rents. The sum of shares of the 
resource rent that accrue to each group of entrepreneurs cannot exceed one. Hence, the 
following constraint must hold:   
                                                 ( 2 )                                                                                                              
The rent seeking factor s =S(α , λ ), captures the relationship between quality of institutions λ, 
fraction of producers α = nP/N and grabbers (1- α). The factor s declines in the quality of 
institutions λ and increases in the size of producers α.   
                                    ( 3 )                                                                                       
The profits of a producer πP  is the sum of profits from production π and the share of the 
resource rents λsR/N. Thus,  
                                            ( 4 )                                                                                          
Producers’ payoff is higher as the quality of institutions is better, or when value of   λ 
increases. Good institutions give them the possibility to get a larger share of the resource rent.   
 
We can show that π(nP) is everywhere positive and increasing in the number of producers 
nP = αN. The total profits to each producer then are  
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                             ( 5 )                                                                          
 
          By rearranging the pay-off for each grabber, equation       we get   
                                          ( 6 )                                                                                             
Entrepreneurs’ decision to whether get involved in grabbing or in productions, is determined 
by the profits entrepreneurs can get from two activities. Both profit functions πG and πP are 
increasing in the fraction of producers α. This is illustrated in Figure 1, where the dashed 
curve represents a lower πG-curve. The πG-curve is high relative to the πP-curve if the 
institutional quality λ is low, the resource rent R is high, or the number of entrepreneurs is 
low. In order to achieve a stable share of producers and grabbers over a period of time, the 
profits must be equal in both   activities 
πp = πg                                                               (7) 
In equilibrium, point b, in Fugure 2.1., where the profit from grabbing equals to the profit 
from production there is no gain to any entrepreneur from switching activities from grabbing 
to production or vice verse.       
 
 
 
 Figure 2.1. Resources and Rent Seeking 
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As a result the economy may end up in one of the following two types of equilibrium: 
Production equilibrium, where all entrepreneurs are producers (πP ≥πG and α = 1).  
Grabber equilibrium, where some entrepreneurs are producers and some are grabbers. When 
the quality of institutions is high, the equilibrium is a production equilibrium and when 
institutional quality is low, the equilibrium is  a grabber equilibrium.  
I the production equilibrium more natural resources is a pure blessing, a higher R raises the 
whole national income. While more natural resources in grabber equilibrium is a curse, a 
higher R lowers national income. 
“The result that more resources reduce total income may seem paradoxical. There are two 
opposing effects: “the immediate income effect” of a higher resource rent R is a one to one 
increase in national income; “the displacement effect” reduces national income as 
entrepreneurs move from production to grabbing. The resource curse follows as the 
displacement effect is stronger than the immediate income effect. An entrepreneur who moves 
out of production forgoes the profit from modern production π(nP), but obtains an additional 
share of the resource rent equal to (1 − λ)sR/N. “ 
“In equilibrium both these two values are equal. With more natural resources the additional 
resource rents to grabbers obviously go up. Producers then prefer to switch to grabbing until a 
new equilibrium is reached. It is a well-known result from the rent-seeking literature that a 
fixed opportunity cost of grabbing implies that a marginal rise in rents is entirely dissipated 
by more grabbing activities. Hence, in these models the displacement effect exactly balances 
the immediate income effect. In our case, however, the positive externality between producers 
implies that the opportunity cost of grabbing declines as entrepreneurs switch from production 
to grabbing. The declining opportunity cost magnifies the displacement effect and explains 
why the displacement effect eventually is stronger than the immediate income effect.”    
Figure 2.2. below illustrates what happens as a country gets a higher resource rent, R. 
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                    Figure 2.2. Rent seeking in the case of  a higher resource rent, R 
 
The discovery of oil, diamonds or foreign aid presents a new source of income in the 
economy. Which profit curve will be shifted upwards depends on the quality of institutions. 
An increase in R is shared between the two groups producers and grabber. The grabbers get a 
larger portion of R if the quality of institutions is low.  A low value of λ results in an upward 
shift of the grabbers profit function. The dashed line in the diagram shows completely grabber 
friendly institutions with λ = 0, causing an entire shift  in the grabbers profit curve 
accompanied by no change in the producers profit curve. Assuming free entry into grabbing, 
πg > πp leads to a new equilibrium b
ll
. This is characterized by a flow of producers into 
grabbing in search of higher profits. The overall effect of this movement is to drive profits all 
the way down to equilibrium b
ll
. Equilibrium b
ll 
has lower profits, very few producers and an 
increased number of grabbers (Figure 2.2).  
Mehlum, Moene and Torvik  (2006) conclude that “countries rich in natural resources 
constitute both growth losers and growth winners. They states that quality of institutions 
determines whether countries avoid the resource curse or not. The combination of grabber 
friendly institutions and resource abundance leads to low growth. Producer friendly 
institutions, however, help countries to take full advantage of their natural resources.” 
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3.  Foreign aid 
 
3.1. Literature review 
The literature on the impact of aid on sustainable growth is controversial, with statements and 
counter-statements about aid effectiveness. A number of studies (Easterly (2003), Easterly, 
Levine, and Roodman (2004), Hansen and Tarp (2001), Roodman (2004), and Rajan and 
Subramanian (2005) suggest that even in countries with good policies, there is no strong 
relationship between aid and growth. These recent studies suggest that corruption and 
mismanagement cannot be the only reasons why aid does not lead to growth. Even if certain 
kinds of aid may have some positive results in the short run (see Clemens, Radelet, and 
Bhavnani, (2004)), the effects are not significant in the longer run. This suggests that while 
some aid does reach the recipient and is actually spent on original goals, goals that lead to 
short run growth, it is still an open question why aid does not have strong and sustainable long 
run effects on growth. 
International foreign aid is an economic aid which is voluntary provided to the countries, 
provinces or groups of people within a country, which are in humanitarian crisis. 
Humanitarian aid is a short term help in an emergency situation.  Development aid is more a 
long term aid. Development aid is aimed mostly to reduce poverty and obtain economic and 
social growth in the recipient country.  Foreign aid is a source for additional capital into the 
country’s economy and has some of the same characteristics as natural resource abundance. 
Both can be a “Big Push” to an economy if they are distributed and managed wise.  However, 
both can also be attractive for politicians to avoid unpopular methods of income accumulation 
like taxation.  
Originally foreign aid should work as help to self-support or to provide a “Big Push” to the 
country’s economy ( Murphy, K., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1986), by providing capital to 
increase investments, so that  countries could avoid the poverty trap (Hagen, 2007). Foreign 
aid should finance investment gap between national savings and required investment level to 
achieve economic growth. The poverty trap can be illustrated by a Solow growth model, as 
shown in Weil ( 2005). His model is based on the idea that a poor country does not have 
enough capital. As a consequence the savings level is low and investments are low, and so the 
14 
 
country remains poor.  An increase in the capital through foreign aid can push the economy 
out of this poverty trap.  As soon as a recipient country achieves economic growth and 
becomes economically independent, it no longer needs foreign aid.  
Different theories give different interpretations of foreign aid. The realist theory focuses on 
aid as an instrument of diplomacy. Given its initial assumption of states behaving in an 
anarchic environment, the realists see foreign aid as an instrument used to ensure state 
security, protection of its political and economic interests. Therefore, taking into consideration 
that aid in this case is given primarily to benefit the donor, its capability to achieve development is 
limited.  
The Marxists school of thought and postmodern tradition sees foreign aid through a 
dependency relationship between a group of wealthy capital rich core and poor periphery 
countries. The rich countries use their position of dominance to control and exploit the 
resources of the poor countries, tying aid to policies, services and goods for gaining access to 
markets and resources.  
The liberal strand of thought concentrates on its economic dimension, in particular the 
effectiveness of development cooperation to address the problems of globalization and 
interdependency such as environmental, health etc.  
The constructivist theory interprets foreign aid as guided by normative principles, ideas of 
humanity about the moral obligation of more affluent countries to help the poorer. Only in 
these conditions an international order could prosper, when it is based on generosity and 
readiness to cooperate in the interest of humanity (Lancaster 2007, pp. 3-4). 
Recently, the debate in the literature about foreign aid is divided in two parts. One examines 
the purposes of foreign aid and the other examines the effectiveness of aid to achieve 
development. The second is the one most relevant for the resource curse problem. 
Studies of the effects of aid on growth and poverty reduction show mixed results. I will first 
discuss the studies that find a positive relation and then the ones that show a negative relation.  
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3.2.  Positive foreign aid-development relationships.  
 
The past 30 years have witnessed the publication of a large number of studies on aid 
effectiveness. The methods used to study foreign aid range from detailed case studies at the 
project level to regression analyses of the growth impact of aid in samples of almost a 
hundred countries. 
For example empirical analysis of Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000) show evidence of 
threshold effects by the introduction of an aid-policy interaction term in the growth 
regressions. In their model, they investigated a new hypothesis that foreign aid does affect 
growth, but that its impact is conditional. It contributes positively to growth, but only in good 
policy environments. 
Similarly, empirical analysis by Radelet (2006) finds that the most important determinants of 
growth are foreign policy and  political relationships. He states that "the view that aid works 
in countries with good policies and institutions has become the conventional wisdom among 
donors". Donors have a variety of motives to give aid and only some of them are related to 
development. The bilateral aid is designed at least partially to serve the economic interests of 
the donor countries (for example tied aid - to support certain objectives that support specific 
groups in donor’s countries). Multilateral is less biased in this respect, although, it cannot  be 
judged immune to influences. However, overall, donors provide most of the concessional aid 
to poorest countries. There was no simple relationship between aid and growth. Some 
countries which received aid grew, others have had recorded slow or even negative results. 
Generally, aid has a positive relationship with growth across countries, but not in each 
country and presents diminishing results as the volume increases (Radelet 2006, pp. 6-8). 
Hansen and Tarp (2000) provide a survey of empirical analyses from the last 30 years that 
make use of cross-country regressions in assessing the effectiveness of foreign aid. From 131 
such regressions, a reasonably consistent pattern emerges. First, that aid increases aggregate 
saving; second,  aid increases investment, and third, aid has a positive effect on the growth 
rate whenever growth is driven by capital accumulation.  
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Estimation of the cross‐country relationship between foreign aid receipts and economic 
growth by Clemens et al (2011) points out that the effects of aid are positive across countries 
on average, but are limited in comparison with other factors of growth. Clements et al(2011) 
re‐analyse data from the three most influential published aid–growth studies of Boone, 
Burnside & Dollar and Rajan & Subramanian. All three research designs show that increases 
in aid have been followed on average by increases in investment and growth. The most 
plausible explanation is that aid causes some degree of growth in recipient countries, although 
the magnitude of this relationship is modest, varies greatly across recipients and diminishes at 
high levels. 
To sum up, aid seems to have the potential for creating growth, but given in the wrong way or 
given to countries which cannot handle it efficiently, it may even be negative. This is the main 
point of this thesis. 
 
3.3. Negative foreign aid – development relationship.  
 
One of the most ardent critics of aid Dambisa Moyo, a Zambian-born international economist 
and author who analyzes the macroeconomy and global affairs argues (Moyo 2009) that 
foreign aid given to elites encourage rent seeking behaviour, hinder reforms and spurs 
corruption. It interferes in the rule of law, the work of institutions and deteriorates the respect 
of civil rights which makes country unattractive for domestic and foreign investments. Fewer 
investments reduce growth and increase poverty levels and given the pressure to lend, donors 
allocate more aid which is diverted, so that the process is continuing in the same vicious 
circle. It establishes a dependency, encourages corruption which has repercussions for growth 
and perpetuates underdevelopment (Moyo 2009, p. 49 ).  
In standard neo-classical growth models Boone (1994, 1996) shows that aid has no impact on 
investment or growth. The result was substantiated by panel data regressions based on a 
sample of more than 90 countries over the twenty years. Based on his regression he concludes 
that "aid programs have not ... engendered or correlated with the basic ingredients that cause 
... growth." Boone’s empirical results have later been questioned.  
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Empirical studies by Hadjimichael et al.(1995), Durbarry et al. (1998), Lensink and White 
(1999), and Burnside and Dollar (2000) are all based on fairly standard cross-country growth 
relations, modified to analyse the effectiveness of aid by adding foreign aid as a fraction of 
GDP. These studies have a lot in common, including overlap in samples and estimation 
methods; and in contrast to Boone (1994), they all find a positive impact of aid on growth. 
On the other hand, empirical study of Doucouliagos and Paldam (2011).  find that “aggregate 
aid has no robust effect on growth, on average.” They states that foreign aid has no significant 
importance, as on average, aggregate development and aid flows are ineffective to generate 
growth.  
Bauer and Yamey (1982) affirms that foreign aid is likely to hinder development. This is 
because the economic results depend on the conduct of people and their governments’ efforts 
and the slow progress of these societies cannot be overcome by foreign aid, but rather will 
reinforce it. They argue that foreign aid`s “monopoly on compassion”, so that nobody can 
criticize these transfers of resources as ineffective or damaging, allows them to claim that 
poor results are due to insufficiency of aid. During decades, sufficient amounts have flowed 
towards recipient governments which did not performed well and created perverse incentives. 
The access to aid of recipients has absolved them from the necessity to create necessary 
conditions for external inflows of capital. The tax revenues are kept low, because of 
availability of aid money extends the power of the existing political status quo and their 
control over the society which results in its politicization. It inhibits private enterprise and 
therefore the inflow of foreign investments, creates overvalued exchange rates, increases 
domestic money supply and inflation, balance of payments difficulties and produces deficient 
fiscal policies.   
Foreign aid also creates perverse incentives such as pauperization of the countries in order to 
be eligible for aid, de-skilling and increases of dependency of these societies on donors 
(Bauer and Yamey 1982, pp. 302-310). Moreover, the work of Djankov et al (2006) 
concludes that foreign aid has a negative impact on economic growth and democratic 
achievements of developing countries, because it reduces investment and increases spending. 
The effectiveness of aid is affected by the type of aid disbursed grants or loans.  Contrary to  Sachs, 
who argues that more aid should be given as grants, they  suggest that loans are a more effective 
measure to ensure the effectiveness of aid (p. 2). The argument is that if aid is given  as loans, 
there are stronger incentives to use these resources efficiently. The recipient country will take 
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care to obtain a good return on the investment in order to pay back the loan. In the case of 
grants, these are mostly increasing  public consumption. Their research has shown that 
increasing foregn aid has no effect on investment,  but it has a significant effect on 
government consumption. Foreign aid has positive effects if the ratio of grants in aid is small 
enough (ibid., p. 17).  
Historically, foreign aid has not influenced economic growth of the recipient country.  
Analysis done in the aid and growth regressions by the Burnside and Dollar, World Bank 
(2000) by researching 56 recipient countries shows that aid spurs growth conditional on the 
quality of institutions and that it does not show the same positive effect in all institutional 
environments. A long- term economic growth is possible in stable macroeconomic 
environments, open trade regimes, protected property rights, as well as efficient public 
bureaucracies that deliver education, health, and other public services. When a country have 
this kind of institutions both aid and revenue from natural resources has a big effect on growth 
and poverty reduction. Equally, aid has little effect on the development of countries with poor 
management.  
These results are similar to the Mehlum’s ones in the “Institutions and the Resource Curse”, 
where foreign aid represents resources and economic policy represents institutions quality. In 
the countries with low political quality foreign aid does not have a significant influence on 
economic growth.  
Mehlum et al (2006) focus on how the quality of institutions affects the decision of 
entrepreneurs that specialize in either rent seeking or production. The model looks at how the 
quality of institutions in countries that have just discovered precious minerals affects the 
incentives of entrepreneurs that specialize in rent seeking and production activities. In their 
model, entrepreneurs freely allocate themselves between rent seeking and productive 
activities as determined by the relative payoffs. The gains from each activity are determined 
by the quality of institutions, such as  the rule of law, bureaucratic quality and corruption in 
government. When institutional quality is high, majority of entrepreneurs engage in 
productive activities. In this case, more natural resources result in higher total income. Poor 
institutions open opportunity for entrepreneurs into grabbing and due to negative externalities 
in rent seeking; more natural resources lower the aggregate income. Their model predicts that 
low institutional quality in resource abundant countries results in a resource curse, whereas 
good institutions lead to a blessing. 
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4.   The role of institutions. Norway, 
Botswana, Zimbabwe and  Moldova  
 
 
The question is:  Why have some countries been able to manage their natural resources 
successfully, while others have failed to reap the potential benefits?  Some potential  answers 
can be identified by examining specific cases. 
 
  4.1. Botswana 
Since its independence from Britain in 1966, Botswana has become one of the success stories 
of developing countries.  From being one of the twenty-five poorest countries in the world 
Botswana end up to be an upper-middle income country in 1998, and reached a per capita 
GDP of 9,200 USD in 2004. The impressive 13,9% GDP growth in the seventies has now 
declined to 3,5% in 2004, but Botswana’s economy still remains one of the fastest growing 
economies in Africa.  
Botwana was a foreign aid recipient  and after discovering diamonds in 1967, it has also been 
a country rich in natural resources. Botswana has  managed both aid and natural resources 
well. As a result, it has  achieved  development and has avoided the resource curse. 
Botswana is regarded as a country with good governance and democratic public institutions. 
This is reflected in the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, where 
Botswana score 65 in 2012, 64 in 2013 and 63 in 2014 CPI index. Botswana  is the least 
corrupt on the African continent, ranking well above some European counties such as Italy or 
Greece. 
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Figure 4.1. The Corruption Perception Index 
  
Source: International Transparency (www.transparency.org) 
 
It also invests a portion of its resource wealth in its Pula Fund, a long-term investment 
portfolio. Established in 1994, its purpose is to preserve a part of the income from diamond 
exports for future generations. Pula Fund serves as a buffer against price volatility. Foreign 
exchange reserves that are in excess of what is expected to be needed are transferred to Pula 
Fund and invested according to the needs. 
 Botswana has also set up mechanisms to ensure that a significant part of its mineral resource 
revenue is allocated for investment in health and education. 
Botswana was reviewed by Transparency International, which is a global civil society 
organisation leading the fight against corruption.  Transparency International is using a 
concept called country’s National Integrity System (NIS), which is a “sum total of laws, 
institutions and practices in a country that maintain accountability and integrity of public, 
private and civil society organisations”. Over the years, the NIS concept has come to be close 
associated with the quality of institutions and practices that form an anti-corruption system. 
Botswana was reviewed in 2001 and several elements of the NIS point out that Botswana has 
developed strong good governance. Democracy is fully practiced in the country. Botswana’s 
government is accountable to the people. Elections are held on a regular basis. The country 
operates a written constitution to which all organs of government are subjected. The rule of 
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law operates fully in the country and it has the right political and legal environment to fight 
corruption. There is also transparency at various levels of government. 
Botswana is a source of inspiration for other developing nations that would like to avoid 
issues of the “resource curse”. 
  
4.2.   Norway 
Another country which is one of the best examples in avoiding the resource curse and 
succeeding in economical development is Norway.  Norway has drawn on its oil wealth to 
move from being one of the poorest countries in Europe during the early 1900s to lead 
UNDP’s global Human Development Index frequently in recent years. 
After Phillips Petroleum discovered Ekofisk in 1971 (one of the world's largest offshore fields 
which expected to continue producing oil until 2050) Norway suddenly became officially rich 
with oil. At the same time occurred the risk of falling victim to the natural-resource curse. The 
Iraqi geologist Farouk al-Kasim who has been more responsible than anyone else for 
Norway’s success as an oil power.( FT Magazine, The Iraqi who saved Norway from oil, 
August 29, 2009.) 
Al-Kasim was put in charge of mapping out how Norway would exploit its newly discovered 
oil resources. He did a remarkable job of connecting private-sector competitiveness with 
government control, and Norway seems to have avoided the “resource curse” that has dragged 
down the economies of many nations with natural resource abundance. Al-Kasim was 
concerned about "Dutch Disease," a phenomenon first seen in the Netherlands in the 1960s, 
when the Dutch economy unexpectedly suffered after a massive gas field was found in its part 
of the North Sea. He knew it would take a clear policy and careful planning to avoid a similar 
situation in Norway.  
He studied other oil-exporting countries, and found that the biggest problem was a lack of 
planning and a clear strategy. Al-Kasim said that,  'Norway concluded that if you don't have a 
policy up front, and if you don't have a consensus on that policy, that human nature would 
tend to favour individual interests rather than coherent national interests”.  
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One radical solution aimed at preventing the oil money from destroying Norway's existing 
industries was to limit the amount of oil revenues the country used in the short term. To help 
reduce short term spending, oil revenues was put it in an oil trust fund which is now worth 
hundreds of billions of dollars. The government only spends the interest that the fund 
generates. 
In 1971, shortly after the Ekofisk discovery, the Norwegian parliament drafted legislation that 
came to be known as the country's "10 Oil Commandments." 
1. National supervision and control must be ensured for all operations on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf (NCS). 
2. Petroleum discoveries must be exploited in a way, which makes Norway as 
independent as possible of others for its supplies of crude oil.  
3. New industry will be developed on the basis of petroleum. 
4. The development of an oil industry must take necessary account of existing industrial 
activities and the protection of nature and the environment. 
5. Flaring of exploitable gas on the NCS must not be accepted except during brief 
periods of testing. 
6. Petroleum from the NCS must as a general rule be landed in Norway, except in those 
cases where socio-political considerations dictate a different solution. 
7. The state must become involved at all appropriate levels and contribute to a 
coordination of Norwegian interests in Norway’s petroleum industry as well as the 
creation of an integrated oil community which sets its sights both nationally and 
internationally. 
8. A state oil company will be established which can look after the government’s 
commercial interests and pursue appropriate collaboration with domestic and foreign 
oil interests. 
9. A pattern of activities must be selected north of the 62nd parallel which reflects the 
special socio-political conditions prevailing in that part of the country. 
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10. Large Norwegian petroleum discoveries could present new tasks for Norway’s foreign 
policy.  
" These 10 Oil Commandments form the basic policy on which Norway has managed its 
petroleum resources ever since. To quote  al-Kasim : "And the politicians not only agreed on 
this document, but they agreed not to debate it in elections and the third miracle ... that they 
kept their promise." This shows that public institutions function well in Norway, providing a 
good environment for economic growth and prosperity. 
Norway and Botswana are two countries with good institutions and wise spending of resource 
incomes. Both countries have almost the same index of economic freedom, which lies above 
the world average and manage to avoid resource curse.  
 
4.3.  Zimbabwe 
 
Zimbabwe is  a country endowed with  significant amounts of natural resources, such as  
diamonds,  but  it still remains one of the poorest countries in the world. When it became  
independent in 1965, Zimbabwe had a diversified economy, well-developed infrastructure, 
and advanced financial sector. It is now one of Africa’s poorest countries. In July 2013, 
President Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-
PF) was re-elected to his seventh five-year term, and his party won three-quarters of the seats 
in parliament. After decades of corruption and mismanagement, Zimbabwe faces an 
economical crises. In 2014, poor harvest left 2.2 million people in need of food assistance. 
In 2006, villagers in the Marange district of eastern Zimbabwe discovered one of the world’s 
biggest diamond deposits. By some estimates, the Marange diamond fields could produce as 
much as 40 million carats a year—worth about $2 billion, or over 10% of the global diamond 
supply. 
Unfortunately, this diamond discovery was too tempting for Zimbabwe’s authoritarian 
president, Robert Mugabe, to resist. In 2008, Mugabe sent his army to take over the control 
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over the diamond fields from unlicensed diamond miners. The Mugabe’s army killed more 
than 200 people and buried them in mass graves. 
After the takeover, the army ran mining operations itself. Local residents, including children, 
were forced to mine for diamonds in slave-like conditions. Killing, beatings, torture and 
sexual violence were all used by the army to keep local residents working and maintain a 
climate of fear. Here we can  see how abundance in natural resources, in this case diamonds, 
easily leads to internal conflicts and wars. . 
Instead of ending military involvement, the government  gave military leaders part of the 
ownership in the companies overseeing mining activities. Smuggling, violence and other 
human rights abuses continued. In 2010, the Zimbabwean police was investigating and 
documented human rights abuses in the Marange diamond fields.  The group of leaders were 
put in prison for five weeks. In October 2011, the BBC discovered how  Zimbabwean soldiers 
brought diamond miners who failed to hand over earnings to a camp, and  used torture, 
beatings, and rape to punish the miners.  
In November 2011 Zimbabwe’s export ban was lifted.  Zimbabwe is now permitted to export 
its unethical diamonds with conflict free certification. The KP’s decision was so controversial 
that it prompted Global Witness, one of the advocacy groups that founded the KP, to resign 
from the certification scheme in protest, calling it an “accomplice to diamond laundering.”  
Zimbabwe’s failure to ensure that its diamonds are ethically mined affects all Zimbabweans. 
In 2012, the advocacy group Partnership Africa Canada estimated that $2 billion in diamonds 
had been lost to smuggling, much of it disappearing into the hands of Mugabe insiders. The 
group called it the “biggest plunder of diamonds since Cecil Rhodes,” the 19th century British 
imperialist who founded De Beers. It is also believed that Mugabe’s political party, ZANU-
PF, used stolen diamond revenues to fund a campaign of voter intimidation and ballot rigging 
that helped Mugabe, a despotic leader, rig a presidential election in 2013 and win a seventh 
presidential term 
Tracking Zimbabwe’s diamond revenues is already an impossible mission. Very little is made 
public. The National Budget Statement only focuses on non-tax revenue in the form of 
dividends and royalties, but does not give details of other diamond incomes, such as through 
tax. Furthermore, little is known about where the money goes. In 2012, despite having 
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been assured of minimum $600 million in diamond dividends, the Finance 
Minister reported that just $43 million had been delivered. At the end of 2013 a new Finance 
Minister announced that despite an expected $61 million, not so much as a cent 
materialized. This year, the Treasury predicted $96m, but failed even to report what it 
received.  
Nearly three quarters of Zimbabwe’s population are living below the poverty line. At the 
beginning of 2014 the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare reported that the 
Treasury had failed to allocate sufficient funds for vital food and education assistance. 
According to the Ministry more than 900,000 children were put at risk of missing school 
while upwards of 1.5m people’s access to food was jeopardised. 
 Zimbabwe is endowed with significant amounts of natural resources but remains one of the 
poorest countries in the world.  Zimbabwe’s economic freedom score is 37.6, making its 
economy the 175
th
 freest in the 2015 Index. Zimbabwe is ranked last out of 46 countries in 
Sub Saharan Africa, and its overall score remains fra below the world and regional 
averages.While political elite lives like a rock star in USA, France and has a multimillion 
dollars estate and luxury cars and speedboats collections, the majority of Zimbabweans 
citizens live in “grinding poverty”. About 8 in 10 of those eligible to work are jobless. 
Citizens spend hours in darkness, because the economy cannot provide their energy 
requirement. Infrastructure is poor and companies are closing, unemployment is increasing. 
Diamonds are being illegally exported and revenue from illegal diamonds export lies in the 
pockets of political elites and their networks. Corruption remains endemic. Civil servants may 
make unpredictable demands for unofficial payments for variety of “servicies”. Zimbabwe 
reform program, characterized by chaos and violence, badly damaged commercial farming. 
 
4.4.  Moldova  
Moldova’s economic freedom score is not so different from Zimbabwean. It score 57,5, 
making its economy the 111
th
 freest in the 2015 Index, Moldova is ranked 39
th
 among 43 
countries in the Europe region, and its overall score is below the regional and world averages. 
If we compare Moldavian and Zimbabwean Index of Economic Freedom we can see that both 
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countries Index lies below the world average. Both countries have corruption as one of 
countries major challenges.    
According to the Word Bank data Moldova received in foreign aid  473 million US dollars in 
2014 and 464 millions in 2015. Although Moldova receives significant amounts of foreign 
aid, it remains one of the poorest countries in Europe.   
Most Moldovans see corruption as one of the country’s major challenges. According to the 
Index of economic freedom “corruption is systemic and deeply embedded  in Moldova’s 
public institutions, especially in law enforcement, the judicial system, public service, political 
parties, the educational system, and legislature,  Bureaucracy and lack of transparency makes 
the formation and operation of private enterprises difficult. The weak rule of law and a lack of 
progress in implementing open-market policies prevent broader and more dynamic economic 
development. Economic performance is far below potential. ” (IEF, 2015)   
In the next section, I will show in more details how weak institutions in Moldova make it 
vulnerable to grabbing, which may lead to a resource curse from foreign aid.  
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5. Foreign aid in Moldova - a curse or aid-
institutions paradox? 
 
The Republic of Moldova ( Moldova) has benefited from foreign assistance since its 
independence in 1991, but is still the poorest country in Europe.  More than one-fifth of the 
country’s population lives in poverty. More than one-quarter of Moldova’s  population works 
abroad. This economic situation is a consequence of the foreign aid curse or aid-institutions 
paradox? Let’s study Moldova’s case to try to understand the relationship between foreign 
aid,  rent -seeking and quality of institutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1.  Poor and vulnerable 
 
Moldova is situated between the rivers Dniester and Prut, an area formerly known as 
Bessarabia. This territory was annexed by the USSR in 1940 following the carve-up of 
Romania in the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact between Hitler's Germany and Stalin's USSR. As a 
result Moldova was ultimately incorporated into the USSR as the Soviet Socialist Republic of 
Moldova (SSR Moldova). On 27 August 1991, the former SSR Moldova declared its 
independence from the Soviet Union under the constitutional name of the Republic of 
Moldova. With a moderate climate and good farmland, Moldova's economy relies heavily on 
its agriculture sector, featuring fruits, vegetables, wine, and tobacco. Although the 
manufacturing sector, specialized in textiles and leather products, has been recovering, 
Moldova’s economy is characterized by the  large agricultural sector which accounted for 
almost one fifth of GDP in 2004. Moldova’s agricultural is actually in a zone at high risk of 
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both frosts and droughts. Hothouse farming was one of the most important areas of 
Moldova’s farm sector during soviet times but it was based on access to cheap energy. Now it 
is no longer profitable or competitive because of high energy costs. The canning industry, 
which was another well-developed branch of Moldova’s agricultural sector, was not upgraded 
in a timely manner and has lost its competitiveness on both external and domestic markets. 
Agricultural and food-processing products accounted for 54% of all exports in 2004.With few 
natural energy resources, Moldova imports almost all of its energy supplies from Russia and 
Ukraine. Moldova's dependence on Russian energy is underscored by a growing $5 billion 
debt to Russian natural gas supplier Gazprom, largely the result of unreimbursed natural gas 
consumption in the separatist Transnistria region. In August 2013, work began on a new 
pipeline between Moldova and Romania that may eventually break Russia's monopoly on 
Moldova's gas supplies. Over the longer term, Moldova's economy remains vulnerable to 
political uncertainty, weak administrative capacity, vested bureaucratic interests, corruption, 
higher fuel prices, Russian pressure, and the illegal separatist regime in Moldova's 
Transnistria region. A 2007 embargo on imports of Moldovan wine to Russia was a serious 
shock to the country’s farm sector and its overall economy. However, it pushed Moldova’s 
vintners to become more competitive by setting much higher standards of quality control. The 
main obstacle to developing Moldova’s agriculture remains its almost complete lack of 
compliance with EU standards and norms. Despite a generally favorable trade regime, the EU 
market remains closed to Moldovan farm products, while the domestic market is too small to 
keep agricultural production at an economically sound level.  
 
 
5.2.   Emigration and remittances 
 
Substantial emigration (close to 400 000 Moldovans were estimated to be working abroad in 
November 2004, around one million in 2010) has resulted in a strong and growing influx of 
worker’s remittances – four times and a half since 2001. According to official NBM statistics, 
the overall level in 2005 is estimated at US$ 900 million which represents close to 30% of 
Moldovan GDP. Remittances are thus a key feature of economic development and social life 
and have contributed directly to reducing poverty. Remittances are also a major revenue item 
in Moldova’s current account; their growth compensates – and makes possible – huge trade 
deficits run by Moldova. In 2006-2007, remittances also became a source of investment 
growth, primarily into housing. Moldova’s imports are now more than double its exports and 
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the trade deficit was close to 40% of GDP in 2005. Understandably, economic growth and 
public finances are at the same time highly vulnerable due to their heavy reliance on 
remittances to cut trade deficits. 
 
 
5.3  Growth 
Over the past five years, the Republic of Moldova's GNP growth has averaged around 5-6 %, 
being driven mainly by compensatory growth in agriculture, but also by revival in 
consumption fuelled by remittances and wage growth. In 2014, GDP growth rate was 4.6 
percent, by 4.8 percentage points lower than in 2013, mainly due to a lower contribution from 
the increased agricultural production and an unfavorable external climate, which has resulted 
in the economic activity deterioration of the major trading partners and the embargoes 
imposed by the Russian Federation.  
 
Figure 5.1. GDP Growth in the Republic of Moldova 
 
 Sourse: World Bank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.  Moldova’s GDP quarterly difference in % 
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Over recent years, Moldova’s economy experienced several shocks, including sharp price 
rises on imported energy in 2005 and a ban on Moldovan wines in the Russian Federation. In 
other words, the country faced the global financial crisis already weakened  by economic 
blows, as GDP growth had declined from 6-7% to 3-4%  in 2007. The economic growth in 
2014 lost velocity and may have become negative in early 2015. Consumers became more 
cautious with their savings, as a result consumption had declined. Exporters are affected by 
the economic problems of Moldova’s main trade partners and  went down.  Moldova's 
economic growth is primarily consumption-driven, with decline in consumption GDP growth  
also slows down.   Investment rates have remained very low.  (World Development Indicators 
database, World Bank).  
 
Figure 5.3. GDP growth in the Republic of Moldova. 
 
 
 
 
Sourse: World Bank 
 
 
5.4. Employment 
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Although Moldovan structural reforms have resulted in the closure of enterprises, 
unemployment has remained relatively stable over the last five years,  around 8% (6.6% in 
2005) according to World Bank estimates. Although the lower numbers may seem 
comforting, they conceal a rather worrying reality: 25% of the active population has left the 
Republic of Moldova, and 50% of those remaining have turned to agriculture for sustenance. 
The average monthly wage of 4000 lei (MOLDSTAT), or approximately US$197, is simply 
not sufficient to live on. This helps explain the existence and role of the Republic of 
Moldova's large shadow economy that, simply put, accounts for a significant quantity of 
hidden income. The economic growth of the last years did not translate into higher 
employment.  The Moldovan economy is failing to generate a sufficient number of jobs. 
“Dutch disease”—the widespread export of labor—is everywhere in Moldova. Of its 3.5 
million population, nearly one million in 2010 are migrants working abroad, representing the 
most educated and skilled part of the workforce. This seriously undermines 
Moldova’seconomic potential. 
 
5.5. Fiscal policy 
 
Fiscal conditions in the Republic of Moldova have also posed a challenge.  Although the 
Republic of Moldova's GDP fell steadily after independence, government expenditures did 
not. The Republic of Moldova's inevitable budget deficit, in turn, eventually threw state 
finances into chaos. Starting in 1997, the government implemented more sound fiscal policies 
to reduce government expenditures. It slashed direct and indirect subsidies to a range of 
sectors and borrowers (mainly state-owned loss-making enterprises), but it also reduced 
public outlays on health, education and social protection. The debt situation has improved, but 
at the expense of public access to critical services. Because tax evasion is widespread, there is 
an ever-present risk of fiscal crisis; and the state's capacity to squeeze the social sector has its 
limits.  
 
5.6. Debt 
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The Republic of Moldova's external debt in 2006 stood at US$2.5 billion.   The Republic of 
Moldova is primarily indebted to international financial institutions (IFIs), but Russia and 
other Paris Club members are also important creditors. In 2006, after signing an arrangement 
of US$118.2 million with the IMF under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, the 
Republic of Moldova was able to negotiate a US$150 million debt rescheduling with the Paris 
Club creditors. Although debt rescheduling has eased fiscal pressures, the Republic of 
Moldova's huge debt continues to loom over the national economy. 
 
 
5.7.  Foreign aid 
International programs working in Moldova have two main goals: to achieve sustainable 
economic growth in order to reduce the gap in quality of life between Moldova and EU 
countries; and to support the poorest Moldovans and organize relief services for them, to 
reduce social inequality and to increase social welfare.  
Over the last decade, the number of donors to Moldova has increased to over 30, but the only 
providers of direct budget support is EU and World Bank.  
The external assistance disbursements to Moldova in 2012 amounted to 465 million Euros ( 
State Chancellery report), i.e. about 8,26% of GDP or about 21.65% of the income to the 
National Public Budget, and about two fifths of the net remittances. Government Decision 
No. 12 dated 19 January 2010 the State Chancellery is the National Aid Coordination 
Authority in the Republic of Moldova and is responsible, at national level, for the 
coordination of programming, monitoring and evaluation of the external assistance delivered 
to Moldova by the development partners. 
The EU budget support assistance in 2007-2013 covers the following sectors: social, health, 
water and sanitation, rural development, energy, justice, mobility and security – visa 
liberalization. The World bank’s budget support provided to Moldova in 2012 ( 30 mln. USD) 
targeting the reforms within economic growth and poverty reduction.  
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The sector budget support programs, implemented in 2012 the EU financial support, targeted 
the health, water and sanitation sectors, economic stimulation in the rural areas and the energy 
sector. 
The European Union is the largest donor for Moldova. Other important donors are European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development( EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), World 
Bank (WB), The Government of the United States of America, UN, the Kingdom of Sweden, 
Austria, the Swiss Confederation and the German Federal Republic. 
 
Figure 5.4. Foreign aid per donor provided in 2012, in percents  
 
 Source: Aid Management Platform public portal of the Government of Moldova  
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Figure 5.5. Allocation of the foreign aid funds in Moldova, 2011-2013 
 
Source: Aid Management Platform public portal of the Government of Moldova 
 
 
Throughout 2004-2011, the Republic of Moldova has benefited from external assistance of 
around 2.99 billion USD, 2.10 billion USD of which are grants( 71%) and 888,8 million 
USD( 29%) loans. The share of aid disbursed in 2012 in GDP is about 8,26% of GDP and 
21,65% of the current National Public Budget.  About 109,4 million Euros ( 148.8 million 
USD) were received in the forms of grants and 97,1 million Euros ( 132,07 million USD) in 
the form of loans( EBRD, EIB and WB) which represents a grant – loan parity of 53% and 
47% of aid received in 2012 ( State Chancellery 2013).  
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Figure 5.6. Report of External Assistant to the Republic of Moldova in 2012 
  
The distribution between the years is irregular but shows a clear tendency of foreign aid flows 
to grow over time.  The periods 2005-2007 was marked by the increase of the volume of aid 
determined by growing assistance from EU and international financial institutions ( IMF, 
WB) 
Figure 5.7.  Moldova: External Grants and Loans to the Budget, 2000-2010  
 
It seems like Moldova has all the necessary tools to actually succeed with economical 
development – willingness of local population and government to implement reforms, support 
from international organizations through both loans and foreign aid, economy which showed 
positive development in the period between 2004 - 2008. Why then it still one of the poorest 
countries in Europe? Why Moldova fails to succeed with its reforms implementation? 
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One of the reasons is the lack of institutional capacity to implement reforms and sustain 
results, even when political will is present. There is often powerful bureaucratic resistance to 
fundamental reforms due to completely unreformed soviet organizational principles and 
structures in public administrations. A soviet-style administration is incapable of operating in 
a democratic political system and market economy, especially when it comes to implementing 
reforms. Not only the institutional base, but also management principles and human resource 
policies in the Government need to be brought in line with EU standards. Moldova’s public 
administration currently suffers from typical soviet symptoms: an unreasonable number of 
employees with generally low competence and poor pay. Blue collar workers in Moldova tend 
to be much better paid than most public servants. 
Another reason is the conflict of interests within the government. Government and the leaders 
of the Alliance tend to pursue different goals. Those more interested in enhancing their 
political capital can be called the reformers, as they are interested in changes. “Others can be 
called rent-seekers, as their interest lies in maintaining status quo or undertaking only 
cosmetic changes instead of serious reforms. Their goal is to take over from the previous team 
in power and gain access to resource flows”( Economic reforms in Moldova: Avoiding the 
Ukrainian trap, 2012 ).  
 
 
5.8.    Moldova – grabbers’ heaven? The robbery of 1 billion USD 
 
Foreign aid funds create incentives for rent-seeking among Moldova’s elites who have the 
access to these funds. A good example of how easy it is to grab in Moldova is the 
disappearance of 1 billion USD,   equivalent to 12% of Moldova's GDP, from 3 of Moldova’s 
largest banks in November 2014.  The National Bank of Moldova engaged a leading financial 
investigation consultancy called Kroll to investigate the transactions in the three banks 
involved,  Banca de Economii S.A., Banca Sociala S.A. and Unibank S.A. The Kroll-report 
(2015) was first confidential, but released after thousands of people protested in the country's 
capital in May, 2015. The Kroll-report identifies 28-year-old Ilan Shor as the mastermind 
behind the robbery. Shor is one of the richest people in the country. His father accumulated 
much of the family's wealth by setting up Moldova's first duty-free shops. The report said 
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Shor and his associates worked together in 2012 to buy a controlling stake in three Moldovan 
banks and then gradually increased the banks' liquidity through a series of complex 
transactions involving loans being passed between the three banks and foreign entities. The 
three banks then issued multimillion-dollar loans to companies that Shor either controlled or 
was connected to. Over $767 million was transferred from the banks in just three days 
through complex transactions. The central bank estimates the total loss from the scheme could 
reach $1 billion. A large portion of this money was transferred to offshore entities connected 
to Shor. Some of the money was then deposited into Latvian bank accounts under the names 
of various foreigners. 
The Kroll report highlights the difficulties of the investigation, because internal reports and 
documentation from the three banks were lost.  Important electronic data was also deleted.  
Kroll report refers to unusual events that took place on the 26 November 2014, at the same 
time as new loans were issued in Banca Sociala. From the Kroll report:  “For unexplained 
reasons, loan exposure was  reversed out of Banca de Economii (BEM) and the existing 
balances held on deposit between BEM and Russian banks cleared down. A complex series of 
transactions eventually resulted in new loans to the value of MDL 13.7 billion being issued by 
BS to five Moldovan entities, who transferred the funds on to UK registered Limited 
Partnerships with accounts at Privatbank in Latvia 
 The above loans were sold to a UK registred shell campany, for nominal value plus accrued 
interest of MDL 4,7 billion, to be paid in annual installments by November 2019. As a result, 
the receivable remains outstanding in BS’s balance sheet. 
Orders were given by management of the banks to archive loan documentation relating to the 
suspicious transactions with entities deemed part of the Shor Group. These were collected by 
a vehicle provided by Klassica Force SRL, which was subsequently stolen and found burned 
out, whilst containing all relevant loan documentation 
Management of BEM attempted unsuccessfully to reverse the original Roseu session 
agreement, restoring the un-performing loans to BUM and returning the cash originally paid 
by Roseau”. (Kroll, 2015)  
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Kroll report states that 12 sacks with documents held by these three banks disappeared under 
“ suspicious circumstances only a few days prior to BEM being placed under special 
administration on 27 November 2014”. An internal investigation conducted by BEM in 
December 2014 established that on 26 November 2014 the acting president of BEM, Viorel 
Birca issued an internal order requiring activating of specific document related to the 
placement and receipts of certain loans. The order was communicated to relevant people and 
12 sacks of files were transfreed to Viorel Birca’s office. A vehicle was ordered from the 
Klassica Force SRL , a security company  which is controlled again by Ilan Shor. All the 12 
saks were loaded into the vehicle on 26 November and according to the driver the documents 
would be transported to the archive the following day, on the 27
th
, the vehicle would be held 
in a secure garage overnight. The following day, Klassica Force SRL informed BEM that the 
vehicle had been stolen and found burned out, a fact confirmed by Moldavian police report 
issued in 1 December 2014. (Kroll, 2015). 
Kroll reports stats that the” events of the latter half of 2014, and particular November 2014, 
show a coordinated effort involving all three banks working together to extract as much loan 
finance as possible from the banks without any obvious business rationale for the increased 
exposure”. Kroll’s investigations point out that majority of top management of all their banks 
who were coordinating November events together with Shor are either relatives, family 
members or good, old friends to Shor.  
The report said a full forensic investigation is needed to identify other potential beneficiaries 
and recover the funds. Shor has been charged with corruption and placed under house arrest, 
but not for a long time. Shor was released from house arrest on 23 May, having agreed to 
cooperate with investigators. At the 01 of July 2015 Ilan Shor has been officially elected as 
the “primar la Orhei” or Mayor of Orhei, one of the middle-sized cities in Moldova.   
Ilan Shor denies responsibility for the financial catastrophe.” The Kroll report - based on 
National Bank records - proves nothing, he says, and contains no documents "apart from 
cuttings from various articles".(www.bbc.com, The great Moldovan bank robbery, 18.june 
2015). 
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5.9. The repercussions of robbery 
 
The robbery caused a great panic in Moldova.  People are still protesting in the streets of 
Chisinau and demand an investigation on missing money from the government. The protesters 
are calling on the government to resign and want an end to corruption. Thousands are holding 
Moldovan and EU flags and chanting "Victory!" and "Go!".  (www.bbc.com, Moldova anger 
grows over banking scandal, September 14
th
, 2015). 
It is also obvious that such an incident continues to have negative effects for the economy. 
The country may run out of funds to pay the public servants , retired ones  and employees. 
Some economists claim that an economic default is what we should expect in Moldova, if 
World Bank or IMF don’t intervene. Such an incident may have eroded any hopes and dreams 
of Moldova’s aspirations to become a part of EU.  As a consequence of November events 
national currency lost 42% of its value during 2 months. 
In order to keep economic stability in the country the government chooses to save the three 
banks, and so they granted them emergency loans. The volume of the guarantees is 
significant, if compared with the size of the Moldovan economy (about 9% of GDP and 34% 
of the state budget revenues). Therefore, public debt as a percentage of GDP will increase 
from 32% in 2014 to 48% in 2015 and 51% in 2016.1 With a budget deficit, current account 
deficit, low level of official reserve assets and risks to the national currency, a higher level of 
indebtedness fuels the country risk. It will generate a significant fiscal shock that may last 10 
years.  
IMF and World Bank have suspended programmes with Moldova, and the EU is considering 
doing the same. World Bank country manager Alex Kremer said at the end of June that : “We 
are advising the authorities that the three banks ... should be liquidated.” He said trying to 
nationalise or recapitalise the banks would risk wasting more taxpayers’ money. 
After the robbery was known, World Bank has blocked assistance of  45 mln.dollars for 
Republic of Moldova, money which should of support the 2015 budget. According to Alex 
Kremer, World Bank Country Manager for Moldova “ World Bank cannot make such a large 
payment into the Government budget until Moldova resolve banking sector problems. It 
would be illogical and irresponsible for the World Bank to transfer our shareholders’ money 
into the budget through the front door while there is a risk of even larger sums of public 
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money being lost out of the back door through fraud and corruption in the banking sector. 
This has been the World Bank’s position since the banking sector issues emerged in early 
2014.” (2015, Jurnal md, Moldovans Deserve a Clean Economy).   
The Nobel Prize winner in economics in 2015, Angus Deaton who is concerned about the 
importance of institutions in the aid recipient country, means that foreign aid reduces 
authorities’ incentives in recipient country to create good, including institutions. Such 
authorities do not need any contact with their citizens, no national assembly, not a taxation 
system ( Dagbladet). This is exactly what is happening in Moldova, where the government 
after November events denies to meet and talk to the thousands of protestants in the streets of 
Chisinau.  
 
 
 
5.10. Low quality of governance 
Along with rent-seeking, corruption is one of the most significant impediments for the reform 
and for the economic recovery of the Republic of Moldova. This has been recognized by both, 
the Government of Moldova, as well as international organizations collaborating with 
Moldova, including the World Bank, UNDP, IMF, and Transparency International. 
According to evaluations by Transparency International, Moldova is placed in a group of 
countries with a high index of corruption. On a descending scale of 10 to 0 (with 0 
representing total corruption and 10 total lack of it), Moldova scored 2.6 in 2000. According 
to this scale, in 2000 Moldova is placed on the 76th place, after the Ivory Coast, and followed 
by the Ukraine and Venezuela. 
In a joint study by the EBRD and the World Bank an opinion poll of about 3000 managers 
from 20 countries in transition was carried out. Its results show that Moldova held the 15
th
 
place from the top in terms of microeconomic governance (the index being equal to 0.52 out 
of a maximum of 3.0), the last place for the quality of macroeconomic governance (the index 
being 0.35), the last place for infrastructure (index being 1.42), and the penultimate place with 
regards to law enforcement (the index being 1.1). 
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According to   the aggregated quality of governance index, Moldova held the last place, with 
an index of 0.82. About 75 % of Moldovan firms mentioned that the legal system does not 
protect 
Their property rights.  Moldovan managers of enterprises spend 17 % of their total working 
time with public officials. This is the top figure amongst all countries in transition.  
Figure 5.8.  Quality of governance index 
 
 
At the same time Moldova was ranked 81
st
 out of 183 economies in the Doing Business 
Indicator in 2012 and 132
nd
 out of 155 countries in the 2012 Logistics Performance Index. 
The Doing Business project provides objective measures of business regulations and their 
enforcement across 189 economies and selected cities at the sub national and regional level. 
Doing Business encourages economies to compete towards more efficient regulation; offers 
measurable benchmarks for reform; and serves as a resource for academics, journalists, 
private sector researchers and others interested in the business climate of each economy. 
Being ranked on the 81 place means that it is not so easy to do business and start and operate 
in the regulatory environment of Moldova.  The Logistics Performance Index is an interactive 
benchmarking tool created to help countries identify the challenges and opportunities they 
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face in their performance on trade logistics and what they can do to improve their 
performance.  
 
5.11.   Public opinion. 
Along with this above mentioned indexes public opinion reflects the unfavorable economic 
and social situation in Moldova. Already in 2013 the public opinion was negative about 
economic situation to the Republic of Moldova. If we look at the poll that was conducted 
during the period 28th of March - 13th of April 2013 which was commissioned by the Institute for 
Public Policy (IPP), with the financial support of SOROS Foundation Moldova we can find evidence 
of disappointment among the populations of Moldova.  The pool from 2013(„Barometer of Public 
Opinion– 2014”. ) is on a sample of 1 115 people from 76 communities, representative for the adult 
population of the Republic of Moldova (except its Transdniestrian area), the maximal sampling error 
is ± 3%. From these 1115 people :  
 68% of the population consider that the Republic of Moldova is moving towards a 
wrong direction. The share of respondents who expressed such an opinion has not 
changed compared to the previous poll.  This opinion is mostly shared by the 
respondents of non-Moldovan nationality, as well as by the ones with a low and an 
average income.  
 In this context, it should be noted that the largest share of population (over 3/4) 
remains discontent with Government policies in the major fields of social life: salaries 
(91%), employment (89%), living standards (88%), pensions (87%), fighting against 
corruption (86%). In general, the degree of discontentment has increased  in all areas 
compared to two years ago.  It is also worth being mentioned that the people’s 
discontentment with the measures aimed at settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict 
is more pronounced (86% - an increase by 6% compared to November 2013) in the 
context of the present events in Ukraine. 
 55% of the population are not content with the present economic situation in the 
country. 45% of respondents consider that the present economic situation has not 
changed compared to the previous year, while 32% of them consider that the situation 
has worsened, this share being by 12% lower than at the previous poll. One 
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respondent out of five perceives some improvements in the present economic 
situation, these are mostly the inhabitants of the rural areas, young people, people with 
a high level of income and the population of Moldovan nationality.   
 With regard to the prospects of the economy in the coming year, the share of 
optimistic respondents amounts to 25%, while 36% of the sample do not expect any 
changes. 25% of the population are doubtful about the future, considering that the 
economic situation will worsen next year. 
 According to the respondents, the major measures intended to boost the social-
economic situation in the country are traditionally targeted at development of the 
economic sector – developing the industry (42%), encouraging investments (26%), 
supporting small business in farming sector (31), as well as at improving the tools for 
law enforcement (40%) and fighting against corruption (33%).  
 The level of people’s trust in the major institutions of the State shows a significant 
increase (compared to the previous poll): Government – from 16% to 28%, Parliament 
– from 14% to 22%, President – from 16% to 25%,  but the level of trust is constant 
compared to the period under consideration of the year 2012. Confusing – the trust 
has increased from the previous poll (which was when?) but is unchaged from year 
2012 The lowest trust was traditionally expressed in relation to political parties (19% 
of respondents expressed very much trust or some trust).  
 3 out of 4 respondents consider that the  people’s will does not rule in the Republic of 
Moldova, while 2 out of 3 respondents think that the elections are not free and fair in 
our country.   
Public opinion has not been better in 2015.  According to the „Barometer of Public Opinion– 
2015”.  
 75,4 % consider that the Republic of Moldova is moving in  a wrong direction. 
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Figure 5.9. Distribution of responses to the question: Is Moldova moving towards 
a right or a wrong direction? 
 
 
 
                      Source: Barometer of Public Opinion 
 
 22,1% of Moldova’s population do not trust their government and think  that changing 
the country’s leadership would i prove the social-economic situation in our country. 
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Figure 5.10.  Distribution of responses to the question: What measures should 
beundertaken to improve the social-economic situation in Moldova? 
 
         Source: Barometer of Public Opinion 
 
 
 At the same time 29,2 % consider strengthening order in the country as prior issue for 
Republic of Moldova right now. 
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Figure 5.11. Distribution of responses to the question: Which three issues do you 
consider as prior now for the Republic of Moldova? 
 
 
Source: Barometer of Public Opinion 
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6. Conclusions 
 
Most foreign aid is designed to meet one or more of four broad economic and development 
objectives: (1) to stimulate economic growth through building infrastructure, supporting 
productive sectors such as agriculture, or bringing new ideas and technologies, (2) to 
strengthen education, health, environmental, or political systems, (3) to support subsistence 
consumption of food and other commodities, especially during relief operations or 
humanitarian crises, or (4) to help stabilize an economy following economic shocks. But  
foreign aid does not always achieve these  goals. On the contrary,  in some cases it has 
negative effects on the social and economical situation,  a so called aid-curse. The key to 
avoid an aid curse and achieve economic development is in the quality of public institutions. 
Good institutions promote democratic reforms and lead the country to prosperity and good 
social and economical development.  
With bad quality public institutions, foreign aid can be a source of rent-seeking, corruption, 
crimes and can keep bad governments in power for too long. Foreign aid can undermine 
incentives for saving, tax collection, and private sector production and as a result slow down 
countries economic growth.  
To cite this year’s winner of the Nobel Prize in economics, Angus Deaton :“The key to 
understanding why aid does not work lies in the relationship between aid and politics. 
Political and legal institutions play a central role in creating the environment needed to 
nurture prosperity and economic growth. Foreign aid, especially when there is a lot of it, 
affects how institutions function and how they change. Politics has often choked off economic 
growth, and even in the world before aid, there were good and bad political systems. But large 
inflows of foreign aid change local politics for the worse and undercut the institutions needed 
to foster long-run growth. Governments that receive most of their revenues from abroad are 
relieved of the need to raise taxes at home, and so do not need to justify their activities to their 
own populations. Aid thus undermines democracy and civic participation, a direct loss over 
and above the losses that come from undermining economic development. These harms of aid 
need to be balanced against the good that aid does, whether that’s educating children who 
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would not otherwise have gone to school or saving the lives of those who would otherwise 
have died. But we cannot look only at the direct benefits, and we need to understand that, in 
the long run, schools and clinics cannot be run from outside the country. Good government 
requires a contract between the state and the people, and aid undermines such contracts. ” 
(Foreign Policy article, The Great Escape,  2013) 
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